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We have to revive the utopia, we have to 
recreate the illusion, we have to build the future 
from the limitations of our own time. 
(Tabaré Vázquez)1 
 
Introduction 
The past decade has arguably seen a significant shift in development discourses emphasising 
the importance of governance issues. From an initial concern with underlining the fact that 
governance ‘mattered’,2 there has developed a growing interest in the specific forms of 
meaningful governance that are pragmatically possible in the contemporary era.3 Whether we 
like it or not, we live in a world that increasingly seems to bear out Francis Fukuyama’s 
notorious declaration that humanity has reached the “end of history”. 4 Certainly, in the wake 
                                                 
* I am deeply indebted to a number of individuals for their help, including first and foremost Sergio Borelli, at 
the time a member of the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires  Equipo de la Coordinación del 
Presupuesto Participativo (Participatory Budget Coordination team). I am also extremely grateful to Jorge 
Navarro, Antolín Magallanes, and Ana Titaferrante of the Secretaría de Descentralización y Participación 
Ciudadana  (Secretariat for Decentralization and Citizen Participation), María Clarisa Rottjer, Rubén Basignana, 
Luisa Mamani, and especially Edith Szilvassy of the Consejo Provisorio del Presupuesto Participativo  
(Provisional Council of the Participatory Budget), Betania Aprile, Fernanda Clancy, and Ariel Alderete, 
respectively of the Centros de Gestión y Participación (Administration and Participation Centres) nos. 2 Sur, 2 
Norte, and 11, Virginia Lencina of Poder Ciudadano  (Citizen Power), Hector Poggiese of the Facultad 
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO – Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences), Luis Fara, 
Alicia Pizzabioche, the Grupo de Vecinos de Boedo y Moreno (Boedo and Moreno Neighbours’ Group), and 
several dozen other participants in the Participatory Budgeting process. I also want to thank Ricardo Romero of 
the Red de Ciencias Políticas Mariano Moreno (Mariano Moreno Political Science network) at the Universidad 
de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires University) and Laurence Crot of the London School of Economics for very 
fruitful exchanges, of both theoretical and empirical information relating to the Participatory Budgeting process 
in Buenos Aires and elsewhere. Finally, I am very grateful to John Harriss for giving me access to his 
forthcoming volume Politicising Democracy: Local Politics and Democratisation in Developing Countries (co-
edited with Kristian Stokke and and Olle Törnquist). 
1 Tabaré Vázquez, leader of the leftwing Frente Amplio (Broad Front), former mayor of Montevideo and newly 
elected President of Uruguay (as quoted in D. Chavez, ‘Montevideo: From Popular Participation to Good 
Governance’, in Chavez, D., and Goldfrank, B., The Left in the City: Participatory Local Governments in Latin 
America, London: Latin America Bureau, 2004b, p.67). 
2 See for example P. Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995; M. Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996; and J. Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics, Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
3 P. Evans, ‘Beyond ‘Institutional Monocropping’: Institutions, Capabilities, and Deliberative Democracy’, 
mimeo, 2002. 
4 F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: The Free Press, 1992. For a similar idea 
specifically in relation to Latin America, see also F. Colburn, Latin America at the End of Politics, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002. 
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of what Samuel Huntington has labelled the “third wave of democratization”, 5 there is 
arguably little other than democracy on offer in the way of plausible governance options, as is 
well exemplified by the hegemonic domination of the so-called ‘good governance’ agenda 
within the development business.6 At the same time, however, while there is no doubt that an 
ever growing number of countries around the world are formally adopting forms of 
democracy, either as their regime of preference or compulsion, it is also evident that these all 
too often end up constituting “choiceless”7 or “disjunctured”8 democracies that provide 
putative citizens with highly imperfect forms of representation and rule.9 Partly as a result of 
this impasse at the national level, there has developed a growing interest in the transformative 
possibilities of “a ‘new politics’ grounded in local political spaces and practices”. 10 More 
often than not associated with the political left,11 a variety of successful micro- level forms of 
participatory governance that can be labelled forms of “empowered deliberative democracy” 
(EDD)12 have proliferated throughout the developing world during the past two decades,13 
explicitly aiming to extend the degree of citizen involvement in local governance matters.  
 
Perhaps the most famous form of EDD is Participatory Budgeting (PB). This paper presents 
an account of the  emergence of PB in Buenos Aires, Argentina, based on information 
collected during six months of field research carried out in April-September 2003. My aim is 
not to explore the actual PB process itself, whether in terms of its institutional design or its 
efficacy, 14 but rather to trace the conditions and context within which it was established. This 
is of particular interest in view of the fact that PB in Buenos Aires was implemented in the 
midst of the recent crisis known as the Argentinazo, which arguably constituted an unlikely 
moment for its realisation. I begin with some theoretical considerations concerning the nature 
of empowered deliberative democracy in general, highlighting the emerging consensus about 
                                                 
5 S. P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991. 
6 For a synthetic outline, see World Bank, Governance and Development, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992; 
World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997. 
7 T. Mkandawire, ‘Crisis Management and the Making of “Choiceless Democracies”’, in R. A. Joseph (ed.), 
State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999. 
8 J. Holston & T. Caldeira, ‘Democracy, Law, and Violence: Disjunctions of Brazilian Citizenship’, in F. Aguero 
and J. Stark (eds), Fault Lines of Democratic Governance in the Americas, Miami: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1997. 
9 See also P. S. Pinheiro, ‘Democracies without Citizenship’, NACLA Report on the Americas, 30:2 (1996), 
pp.17-23; and D. Rodgers, ‘Old Wine in New Bottles or New Wine in Old? Conceptualisating Violence and 
Governmentality in Contemporary Latin America’, Crisis States Discussion Paper 6, London: Crisis States 
Research Centre, 2004. 
10 J. Harriss, K. Stokke & O. Törnquist, ‘Introduction: The New Local Politics of Democratisation’, in J. Harriss, 
K. Stokke & O. Törnquist (eds), Politicising Democracy: Local Politics and Democratisation in Developing 
Countries, mimeo, forthcoming. See also A. Fung & E. O. Wright (eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional 
Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance , London: Verso, 2003; and J. Gaventa, ‘Towards 
Participatory Governance: Assessing the Transformative Possibilities’, in S. Hickey & G. Mohan (eds), 
Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation, London: Zed Books, 2004. 
11 See Chavez & Goldfrank (2004). 
12 A. Fung & E. O. Wright, ‘Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance’, 
Politics and Society, 29:1 (2001), pp.5-41. 
13 For wide-ranging collections of studies, see the recent special issues of Environment and Urbanization (vol. 
16, no. 2, 2004) on ‘Participatory Governance’, and of the IDS Bulletin (35:2, 2004) on ‘New Democratic 
Spaces?’, as well as Fung & Wright (2003), Chavez & Goldfrank (2004), and Harriss et al. (forthcoming). 
14 This will be the subject of a future paper. For existing overviews, see M. Landau, ‘Ciudadanía y Relaciones de 
Poder: Los Usos de la Participación en los Programas de Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires’, mimeo (paper 
presented to the II Congreso de Sociología y VI Jornadas de Sociología de la Universidad de Buenos Aires), 
2004; and J. Navarro, ‘Presupuesto Participativo en Buenos Aires: Balance y Perspectiva’, mimeo, 2004. 
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the necessary presence of strong programmatic political parties in order for such initiatives to 
be effectively implemented, which points to the importance of local political dynamics. I then 
provide some background to the crisis in Argentina, in order to situate the context within 
which PB was instituted and show how the conditions theoretically needed for its emergence 
were effectively absent. I follow this with a detailed account of the politics surrounding PB in 
Buenos Aires, delineating the contours of its ‘political field’, and showing how and why 
different actors within this field interacted with each other in relation to the implementation 
and administration of PB during 2002-2004. 
 
The main line of my argument is that the Government of the (Autonomous) City of Buenos 
Aires (GCBA) implemented PB as an improvised ‘top-down’ response to the crisis of the 
Argentinazo, and that the different parties involved had distinct, and often contradictory, 
reasons for promoting or accepting the process, both initially and as it unfolded, that did not 
necessarily coincide with the PB process’s stated aims of extending citizen participation in 
local governance. At the same time, the resulting constellation of competing interests that 
came together did so at a particular moment in time and in a unique context precipitated by 
the Argentinazo that temporarily held them in check vis-à-vis each other, and unintentionally 
created a space within which a remarkably effective PB process was able to develop during 
2002-2003. In many ways, the very context of crisis that led to the establishment of PB in the 
first place was therefore key to its successful implementation, to the extent that it could be 
argued that “in the crisis lay the solution”, 15 to what seemed rather unpromising circumstances 
for PB to be established. Subsequent shifts in the balance of political power have led to the 
probably terminal decline of PB in Buenos Aires, however, although certain factors 
eventually allow a faint glimmer of hope for the future. The Buenos Aires case is important in 
that it points to a different possible scenario for the successful emergence and implementation 
of PB, while simultaneously reaffirming some of the central insights of studies of other PB 
processes and their sustainability. 
 
 
Empowered deliberative democracy in theory and practice 
There is a rapidly expanding literature on what Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright have 
labelled “empowered deliberative democracy” (EDD).16 This is an institutional model of 
participatory governance that is based on a deliberative as opposed to a representational 
democratic framework, and that seeks to address the “democratic deficit” often associated 
with the latter, particularly in the developing world.17 Rather than being organised around the 
delegation of authority to an elected agent, EDD extends and enhances citizen participation in 
governance by devolving the exercise of authority through a process of bottom-up public 
deliberation, which seeks to arrive at a consensual construction of a ‘common good’ through 
the persuasive transformation of preferences by force of (the better) argument rather than 
power politics. Deliberation constitutes a bargaining process that occurs through logical 
reasoning in a local public forum rather than through conflicts of interests, and the public 
space within which it occurs is one in which “citizens can participate as equals”. 18 At the same 
time, EDD is not a voluntaristic form of organisation insofar as it is fundamentally a state-
centred process, with the state remaining the principal medium for the enactment of the 
                                                 
15 J. Godio, Argentina: en la crisis está la solución, Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos, 2002. 
16 Fung & Wright (2001), pp.17-25. See also Fung & Wright (2003). 
17 A. Cornwall, ‘Introduction: New Democratic Spaces? The Politics and Dynamics of Institutionalised 
Participation’, IDS Bulletin, 35:2 (2004), p.1. 
18 L. Avritzer, Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, 
p.5. 
 4
consensually agreed-upon ‘common good’. Rather, EDD involves “a radical reconfiguration 
of relationships and responsibilities”,19 and the ‘local public spheres’ that it constitutes 
become a privileged means of transformative connection between civil society and political 
society. Indeed, to a large extent, this is what is distinctive about EDD, in that it is a political 
process that attempts to link “public reasoning” with the political system in a way that goes 
beyond just influencing it.20 
 
EDD therefore corresponds to “a conception of the vitalisation of democracy (or the 
establishment of more meaningful alternatives to it) through popular participation in local 
public spheres”. 21 It is a political model that aims to foster fairer, more inclusive, and more 
efficient decision making in society through processes of joint planning and problem solving 
that involve ordinary citizens, and in doing so inherently make them better citizens and 
enhances the quality of their life and government.22 Participatory Budge ting (PB) is perhaps 
the best-known form of EDD. The forms of participatory budgeting are highly diverse, but the 
process basically involves citizens participating in forums for discussion about budgetary 
concerns, generally at the municipal level although PB has also been experimented with at the 
provincial state level. The central goal of PB is to hand over decisions about the allocation of 
municipal funds for basic urban infrastructural improvements – paving streets, extending 
drainage, building new schools and health centres, etcetera – to neighbourhood- level forums. 
The proportion of the budget controlled by a PB process can vary tremendously, from just a 
few percent to the whole of the investment budget of a municipality; and some PB processes – 
such as the one promulgated in Buenos Aires – seek to determine certain priority public 
works to be taken into account within overall municipal spending, rather than a specific 
percentage of this spending. Over 250 cities in Africa, Asia, Europe, as well as North and 
South America, have implemented PB, 23 including the paradigmatic and foundational case of 
Porto Alegre in Brazil, where it was first applied in 1989.24 This city enjoys better than 
                                                 
19 Cornwall (2004), p.1. 
20 Harriss et al. (forthcoming). 
21 Harriss et al. (forthcoming). 
22 To this extent, EDD implicitly constitutes a practical realisation of Sen’s “capability approach” (A. Sen, 
Development as Freedom, New York: Knopf, 1999). 
23 Y. Cabannes, ‘Participatory budgeting: A significant contribution to participatory democracy’, Environment 
and Urbanization , 16:1 (2004), p.27. 
24 See R. Abers, ‘From Ideas to Pracice: The Partido dos Trabalhadores and Participatory Governance in Brazil’, 
Latin American Perspectives, 23:4 (1996), pp.35-53, ‘From Clientelism to Cooperation: Local Government, 
Participatory Policy, and Civic Organizing in Porto Alegre, Brazil’, Politics and Society, 26:4 (1998), pp.511-
537, and Inventing Local Democracy: Grassroots Politics in Brazil, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000; J. 
Ackerman, ‘Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond “Exit” and “Voice”‘, World Development, 32:3 (2004), 
pp.447-463: L. Avritzer, ‘Democratization and Changes in the Pattern of Association in Brazil’, Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 43:3 (2000), pp.59-76, and (2002); S. Baierle, ‘The Explosion of 
Experience: The Emergence of a New Ethical-Political Principle in Popular Movements in Porto Alegre, Brazil’, 
in S. E. Alvarez, E. Dagnino & A. Escobar (eds), Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Revisioning Latin 
American Social Movements, Boulder: Westview, 1998; G. Baiocchi, ‘Participation, Activism, and Politics: The 
Porto Alegre Experiment and Deliberative Democratic Theory’, Politics and Society , 29:1 (2001), pp.43-72, 
Radicals in Power: The Workers’ Party and Experiments with Urban Democracy in Brazil, London: Zed Books, 
2003, and ‘Porto Alegre: The Dynamism of the Unorganised’, in D. Chavez & G. Goldfrank (eds), The Left in 
the City: Participatory Local Governments in Latin America, London: Latin America Bureau, 2004; Evans 
(2002); T. Genro & De Souza, U., Orçamento Participativo: A Experiência de Porto Alegre, São Paulo: 
Fundação Perseu Abramo, 1997; P. Heller, ‘Moving the State: The Politics of Democratic Decentralization in 
Kerala, South Africa and Porto Alegre’, Politics and Society, 29:1 (2001), pp.131-163; K. Koonings, 
‘Strengthening citizenship in Brazil’s democracy: Local participatory governance in Porto Alegre’, Bulletin of 
Latin American Research, 23:1 (2004), pp.79-99; B. de Sousa Santos, B., ‘Participatory Budgeting in Porto 
Alegre: Toward a Redistributive Democracy’, Politics and Society, 26:4 (1998), pp.479-497; C. Souza, 
‘Participatory budgeting in Brazilian cities: Limits and possibilities in building democratic institutions’, 
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average infrastructure and better performing public services than other non-PB cities of 
comparable size and socio-economic profile, and the process has reportedly also “created an 
enabling environment” in which there has developed “a new relationship between government 
personnel and local citizens”. 25 
 
There is no doubt that instances of deliberative democracy such as PB can make significant 
differences in a variety of contexts, both in material and infrastructural terms, but also by 
fostering processes of construction of renewed senses of citizenship and political 
community. 26 The question, however, is to what extent they genuinely constitute processes 
whereby:  
a loosely bounded set of ideas and beliefs that the uncoordinated and highly 
decentralised actions of civil society entities, market actors and local government 
agents are engaged in a mutually reinforcing movement to produce all good things 
for all people.27  
Certainly, it can be argued that there is frequently a sense in which EDD in general, and PB in 
particular, seem to be seen as holistic panaceas to all the ills of underdevelopment, in a 
manner reminiscent of the way ‘participation’ in the 1990s spuriously became the one-stop, 
catch-all solution to the so-called ‘development impasse’.28 In this respect, although openly 
optimistic about deliberative institutions, Peter Evans argues that they have to overcome at 
least three potential problems in order to fulfil their putative promise. Firstly, they must be 
socially self-sustaining – in other words, citizens must be willing to participate. Secondly, 
they must overcome what Evans calls the “political economy problem”, that is to say the 
opposition of the powerful who have vested interests in existing decision-making structures. 
Finally, they must not be economically inefficient.29 
 
This last issue we can take as a given; deliberative processes involving economic affairs will 
in the final analysis be subject to the same laws of accounting as non-deliberative forms of 
government, and indeed countless examples all over the world have shown that spending 
beyond your means will simply not work in the long run, whether you are an individual or a 
state (although in the latter case it is sometimes necessary to adopt what Alfred Marshall 
called the “long view” in order to appreciate the fundamental truth of this axiom). The first 
problem, however, that citizens must be willing to participate, arguably relates to a 
fundamental epistemological question concerning the nature of civil society participation. As 
Arnab Acharya, Adrián Gurza Lavalle, and Peter Houtzager point out, there exist two major 
perspectives on this matter, which they label respectively a “civil society” and a “polity” 
perspective. On the one hand, the former holds that it is relatively unproblematic for 
individual or collective actors to reach and use institutional arrangements for citizen 
participation insofar as: 
                                                                                                                                                        
Environment and Urbanization, 13:1 (2001), pp.159-184. The case of Porto Alegre is so paradigmatic that 
Baiocchi labels it “a school of deliberative democracy” (Baiocchi, 2001, p.55). 
25 Abers (1998), pp.529 & 534. 
26 Avritzer (2002), in particular, conceives of the “local public spheres” of EDD as transformative “bridges” 
between civil society and political society that transfer new democratic practices from the former to the latter, 
thereby contributing to consolidating democracy in transition societies. 
27 P. Houtzager, ‘Introduction: From Polycentrism to the Polity’, in P. Houtzager and M. Moore (eds), Changing 
Paths: International Development and the New Politics of Inclusion, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2003, cited in Harriss et al. (forthcoming). 
28 See D. Rodgers, ‘Rhetoric vs. Reality: “Participatory Development”, Cooperation, and the case of the AMUL 
cooperative’, Cambridge Anthropology, 19:1 (1996), pp.74-76. 
29 Evans (2002), p.17. 
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authentic civil society actors are a democratising and rationalising force of public 
action because of their deliberative logic (versus interest-based), decentralised 
nature and rootedness in the social life of local communities and autonomy.30  
The latter “polity” perspective, on the other hand, suggests that participation is a contingent 
outcome, and that it is “produced as collective actors (civil society, state and other) negotiate 
relations in a pre-existing institutional terrain that constrains and facilitates particular kinds of 
action”. 31 Depending on which approach one adopts, the problem of sustained participation 
will be viewed very differently. 
 
Put simply, from the ‘civil society’ perspective civil society participation in deliberative 
institutions emerges almost automatically from what is implicitly conceived as an ebullient 
and vibrant mass of autonomous individual agents and collective actors that want to become 
engaged in a meaningful manner, and will force engagement to occur in an egalitarian way.32 
As Günter Schönleitner emphatically demonstrates in his meticulous comparative case study 
of deliberative health councils in four Brazilian municipalities,33 it is rarely quite so simple, 
however. He shows how different combinations of different types and levels of government 
commitment on the one hand, and civic organising on the other, produce distinct political 
outcomes, ranging from situations with highly unequal relations and top-down incorporation 
to situations of political equality and bottom-up political integration. This points to the fact 
that social actors are institutionally embedded within larger contexts, and that they will be 
connected to spaces and actors other than those involved in a given deliberative process. This 
fundamentally challenges the idea that civil society consists of autonomous social actors, and 
suggests that adopting a ‘polity’ approach makes more sense. Certainly, this is what Acharya, 
Gurza Lavalle, and Houtzager do in their study of PB and deliberative policy councils in São 
Paulo. They specifically focus on what factors increased or decreased the propensity of civil 
society actors to participate in these deliberative processes, and trace the existence of dense 
linkages between civil society and what they term “political society”, identifying affiliations 
with traditional institutional actors such as political parties as being particularly significant.34 
 
This brings us squarely onto the problem of ‘political economy’ identified by Evans. There 
are two possible ways of approaching this issue, which can respectively be labelled 
‘endogenous’ and ‘exogenous’. The ‘endogenous’ approach examines the issue of who 
participates from inside the deliberative process. For example, both Baiocchi and Fung and 
Wright point out that inequality within the EDD process is one of the biggest threats to 
effective deliberation, as it can subvert deliberative arrangements in a variety of different 
ways.35 Certain participants may be better-off citizens or dominant groups as a result of their 
privileged links to political parties or the State, for example, and might use their superior 
resources to promote collective decisions that favour them. Powerful participants may also 
attempt to exclude or avoid issues that constitute a threat to their interests, to the extent that in 
cases where deliberative democratic arrangements seriously challenge their power and 
privileges, they may seek to dismantle them. This latter point implicitly underlines a critical 
                                                 
30 A. Acharya, A. Gurza Lavalle & P. P. Houtzager, ‘Civil Society Representation in the Participatory Budget 
and Deliberative Councils of São Paulo, Brazil’, IDS Bulletin, 35:2 (2004), p.41. 
31 Acharya et al. (2004), p.41. 
32 See, for example, Avritzer (2002). 
33 G. Schönleitner, ‘Can Public Deliberation Democratise State Action? Municipal Health Councils and Local 
Democracy in Brazil’, in J. Harriss, K. Stokke, and O. Törnquist (eds), Politicising Democracy: Local Politics 
and Democratisation in Developing Countries, mimeo, forthcoming. 
34 Acharya et al. (2004). 
35 See, respectively, Baiocchi (2001), pp.49-54; and Fung & Wright (2003), pp.18-20. 
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dilemma concerning the nature of deliberative institutions insofar as it demonstrates starkly 
that the criteria upon which deliberative democratic processes are designed is by no means 
objective. As Schönleitner points out, “one must postulate either a benign deus ex machina to 
design the institution in question”, or else a process of subjective choice that is inextricably 
linked to external power relations. 
 
This relates directly to the ‘exogenous’ dimension of the political economy problem. It is an 
exogenous dimension insofar as it has little to do with the deliberative process and its 
institutional design per se, but rather relates to the origins and sustainability of the process. 
Power relations are the key factor here, with the basic issue being that “if powerful actors do 
not renounce their power over others as a means for shaping collective decision-making, 
deliberation can hardly be sustained”.36 Certainly change is generally very difficult to achieve 
when certain individuals and organisations have disproportional bargaining power as a result 
of an existing institutional framework, as they will obviously have a stake in perpetuating the 
system, and the crucial question to ask is therefore “what political context is necessary to 
carry out such an experiment in the real world”?37 At one level, it is not completely 
implausible to imagine circumstances in which traditional political actors are prepared to 
spontaneously “give up part of their power in favour of institutions that incorporate citizens 
and try to establish a new relationship between state and society”, 38 mainly because power lost 
because of, for example, diminished scope for using public works as resources for patronage 
could be compensated for by “power and legitimacy gained through increased ability to 
deliver public goods in general and the increased engagement of constituents in the political 
process”. 39 However, this kind of self- induced transformation is relatively unlikely except in 
very specific contexts and under particular circumstances, as the introduction of new – or the 
recomposition of existing – institutional arrangements generally tends to be fraught with 
uncertainty, 40 and consequently it is much more the case that the successful implementation of 
EDD processes requires some sort of challenge to existing power structures, or in other 
words, that it is a question of politics. 
 
Certainly, this is the conclusion of Patrick Heller’s ground breaking comparative study of 
EDD initiatives in Kerala, South Africa, and Porto Alegre, where he underlines these sorts of 
processes were: 
given life …because they were underwritten by …the political initiative of a 
programmatic party …that could successfully circumvent traditional 
powerbrokers and build direct political ties with local forces.41  
As a recent collection highlights, such programmatic parties are generally associated with the 
left of the political spectrum, to the extent that in many ways it can be argued that the 
proliferation of EDD initiatives has become inextricably associated with left politics in Latin 
America.42 Certainly, at the very least, “since the early 1980s, local politics have become a 
privileged space for the left experimenting with social reforms”. 43 What this points to in 
relation to EDD processes and their implementation is that they will invariably emerge from 
                                                 
36 Schönleitner (forthcoming). 
37 Baiocchi (2001), p.45. 
38 Avritzer (2002), p.170. 
39 Evans (2002), p.25. 
40 See J. Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
41 Heller (2001), p.158. 
42 Chavez & Goldfrank (2004).   
43 D. Chavez, ‘Introduction: Local Left Politics in a Democratising Region’, in Chavez & Goldfrank (2004a).  
 8
what Evans labels “local political dynamics”. 44 As Harriss, Stokke and Törnquist remark, this 
is something that has tended to be relatively under-examined in the literature, which has 
generally focused more on the institutional design aspects of EDD initiatives (often with the 
implicit aim of determining their eventual replicability).45 However, as Heller emphasises, 
“we need to develop models of analysis that explicitly unpack the configurations and 
conditions under which social forces and political actors become agents of transformation” in 
order to truly understand the factors that enable EDD initiatives to come about and to be 
sustainably implemented,46 and to this end Harriss, Stokke and Törnquist propose a four point 
agenda for researching the “local political dynamics”. This involves: 
 
a) Examining the local power relations and politics surrounding the establishment and 
implementation of a given EDD process; 
b) Determining the factors that open up the “local political spaces” of a given EDD 
initiative; 
c) Establishing what factors influence the capacities of actors to operate within these 
spaces; and 
d) Exploring the ways in which social actors try to master and alter their conditions of 
power by employing and developing – or avoiding and undermining – EDD in other 
political spaces.47 
 
My intention here is to focus principally on the first of these four points, paying particular 
attention to the origins and the establishment of PB rather than its implementation, although I 
will inevitably make some comments about this latter issue.48 What I aim to do, in other 
words, is to explore the nature and workings of the politics that surrounded the establishment 
of PB in Buenos Aires. Following Pierre Bourdieu, I conceive these in terms of a “political 
field”, 49 that is to say a relational space constituted of positioned actors, connected by 
relations of power that variably accrue them on the basis of the different forms of capital – 
economic, social, cultural, and symbolic – that they possess, and who compete in order to 
accumulate further capital and change existing balances of power. The interactions between 
different actors within a political field and the changing relations of power that connect them 
shape the range of possibilities for strategic practices and decision making, 50 and the issue that 
I want to elucidate is how it is that a “window of opportunity” that permitted the development 
of PB in Buenos Aires came to emerge.51 This is particularly critical to examine considering 
                                                 
44 Evans (2002), p.29. See also Harriss et al.  (forthcoming); and P. Houtzager, A. Gurza Lavalle & A. Acharya, 
‘Who Participates? Civil Society and the New Democratic Politics in Sao Paulo, Brazil’, IDS Working Paper 
210, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2003. 
45 See Harriss et al.  (forthcoming). 
46 Helle r (2001), p.159. 
47 See Harriss et al.  (forthcoming). 
48 Dealing with the other three points would require setting out a detailed analysis of the actual PB process itself, 
which will be the subject of a future paper. 
49 See P. Bourdieu, ‘La representation politique: Eléments pour une théorie du champ politique’, Actes de la 
Recherche en Sciences Sociales, 37 (1981), pp.3-24, and The Logic of Practice, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1990. 
50 For Bourdieu, “the political field is one of the privileged sites for the exercise of the power of representation 
or manifestation [in the sense of demonstration – trans.] that contributes to making what existed in a practical 
state, tacitly or implicitly, exist fully, that is, in the objectified state, in a form d irectly visible to all” (Bourdieu 
(1981), p.235, as translated by L. Wacquant, ‘Pointers on Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics’, 
Constellations, 11:1 (2004), p 4). 
51 Abers (1998), p.530. See also Harriss et al. (forthcoming). 
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that PB was established and implemented in Buenos Aires in the face of highly unlikely 
circumstances of overwhelming economic and political crisis. 
 
 
Conceptualising the nature of the Argentinazo 
Following a decade in which it was held up as a developmental showcase for the IMF’s  
prescriptions and a role model for the rest of Latin America to emulate, Argentina 
dramatically fell from economic grace in December 2001. Although the country had been in 
the grips of a profound economic crisis from the mid-1990s onwards, events accelerated 
suddenly in November-December 2001. Widespread concerns – both internal and external – 
about the impending collapse of the Argentinean peso’s fixed one-to-one exchange rate with 
the US dollar (the so-called ‘convertibility’), possible default on external debt, capital flight 
of some US$25 billion during the preceding eight months, and worsening economic recession 
led to President Fernando de la Rúa’s government desperately imposing draconian measures 
that limited withdrawals from private bank accounts. This precipitated massive social protests 
that culminated in a two-day period of widespread violence, looting, and police repression on 
19-20 December 2001 that has come to be known as the ‘Argentinazo’. De la Rúa resigned on 
20 December 2001 and there were three different Presidents in ten days before Senator 
Eduardo Duhalde became president on 1 January 2002, to serve the remainder of de la Rúa’s 
term until December 2003. Duhalde oversaw the end of the peso’s fixed exchange rate 
regime, a subsequent sharp devaluation, and default on Argentina’s public and private foreign 
debt of US$132 billion (the largest default in history). Not surprisingly, he also presided over 
a dramatic contraction of the Argentinean economy, as GDP fell by 16 percent in the first 
quarter of 2002, and industrial production by 17 percent during the first seven months of 
2002. The peso collapsed to one quarter of its pegged value, and inflation spiralled. 
Unemployment soared to over 30 percent of the workforce, schools closed down for several 
months, and state pensions and public sector workers’ salaries went unpaid. The proportion of 
the Argentinean population living below the poverty line increased to 57 percent by October 
2002, compared to 37 percent in October 2001.52 
 
The crisis cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of its politics.53 As Laura 
Tedesco points out, a critical factor to understanding the origins of the crisis was the chronic 
weakness and fragmentation of the Argentinean political system: 
Limits to Argentina’s democratic culture have played a significant role in the 
crisis. [A] kind of ‘informal politics’ …has contributed to the unleashing of 
political and social turmoil …The social protests that brought down Fernando de 
la Rúa’s government …signa l an awakening of civil society after a decade of 
supine tolerance of an institution-weakening, Executive-oriented democracy. At 
the same time, however, they also reflect and further reinforce the absence of 
                                                 
52 See E. Galasso & M. Ravallion, ‘Social Protection in a Crisis: Argentina’s Plan Jefes y Jefas’, Policy Research 
Working Paper Series 3165, The World Bank, 2003; L. Manzetti (ed.), Regulatory Policy in Latin America: 
Post-Privatisation Realities, Coral Gables: North-South Center Press, 2000; and L. Tedesco, ‘Introduction: 
Crisis in Argentina’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 22:2 (2003), pp.165-169. 
53 P. Oxhorn, ‘History Catching Up with the Present? State-Society Relations and the Argentine Crisis’, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 15:3 (2002), pp.499-514; E. Peruzzotti, ‘Civic Engagement in 
Argentina: From the Human Rights Movement to the “Cacerolazos”’, mimeo, 2002; and L. Tedesco, 
‘Argentina’s Turmoil: The Politics of Informality and the Roots of Economic Meltdown’, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 15:3 (2002), pp.469-481. 
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political channels capable of providing for the more systematically and 
proactively deliberative articulation of interests.54 
 
Both Raúl Alfonsín of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), who became the first elected 
president of the post-dictatorship era in 1983, and Carlos Menem of the the Partido 
Justicialista (PJ), who succeeded him in 1989 and was president until de la Rúa came to 
power in 1999, had ruled in highly personalised ways, to a large extent drawing their 
legitimacy from the traditional Argentinean cultural figure of the ‘caudillo’, or ‘big man’.55 
They governed by means of alternating confrontation and cooperation, building fluctuating 
and tactically motivated temporary alliances which led to: 
an informal system of implementing policies, forming shifting coalitions, and 
arriving at decisions that undermined the working of the state as a set of 
formalised institutional procedures.56  
This ‘politics of informality’ delegitimised both horizontal and vertical mechanisms of voice, 
accountability, collaboration and consensus building, thereby transforming Argentinean 
democratic politics into a glorified form of ‘personalismo’, with politicians at all levels 
following their own agendas rather than attempting to implement a programmatic political 
agenda, and most tending to draw their power from personalised forms of local clientelism 
rather than affiliation to a political party or ideology. 57 
 
Borrowing from Paulo Sergio Pinheiro and his description of post-dictatorship Brazil,58 in 
many ways it can be contended that Argentinean post-dictatorship democracy rapidly became 
a form of “democracy without representation”, or in other words a democratic system that 
displayed all the formal trappings of democracy but offered very little to its constituents in the 
way of actual representation and even less in terms of accountability. 59 The question of 
political accountability in Argentina arguably took a turn for the worse during the 1990s as a 
result of the government’s adoption of certain economic policies that ‘locked’ the country into 
a particular societal model and effectively ‘disconnected’ economic issues from political 
issues. Menem’s accession to the presidency coincided with a period of hyperinflation that 
was the culmination of a decade of extreme economic turbulence in Argentina, and after some 
initial hesitation, his government turned to policies frequently designated as ‘neo- liberal’ in 
order to successfully bring the country’s rampant inflation under control. The centre point of 
                                                 
54 Tedesco (2002), p.469. 
55 R. Romero, ‘Presupuesto Participativo y Formas de Recuperar la Democracia: Viabilidad en la Ciudad de 
Buenos Aires’, mimeo, 2001. 
56 Tedesco (2002), p.478. 
57 See J. Auyero, ‘The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account’, Latin American Research 
Review, 36:1 (2000), pp.55-81; and S. Levitsky, ‘An “Organised Disorganisation”: Informal Organisation and 
the Persistence of Local Party Structures in Argentine Peronism’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 33:1 
(2001), pp.29-61. 
58 Pinheiro (1996). 
59 The issue of accountability was starkly reflected by the manner of Menem’s presidency, during which he 
abused executive power by ruling by decree in an unprecedented manner, issuing 335 decrees during his first 
term, and 210 in his second, compared to the mere 30 decrees issued by all the prior democratically elected 
presidents of Argentina since 1853 put together. He furthermore increased the numb er of judges on the Supreme 
Court from five to nine judges, thereby allowing him to curtail the Judiciary’s independence, and effectively 
emasculated the Legislative by taking levels of clientelism and political patronage to unprecedented levels, in 
particular through the targeted redistribution of federal funds. Seven out of the ten provinces receiving the most 
federal funds during his presidency were under the control of his party, the PJ, with Menem’s home province of 
La Rioja receiving most. At the same time, the overall transfer of federal funds to the provinces increased from 
about US$7 billion at end of Alfonsín’s presidency in 1989 to US$17 billion in 1998. 
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his efforts was ‘convertibility’, whereby the Argentinean currency was devalued and then 
pegged at parity to the US dollar, with the government backing up each newly (re-)introduced 
peso in circulation with a dollar reserve. This allowed the government to control the national 
money supply and brought stability, thereby encouraging international investment while at the 
same time permitting the restructuring and technological modernisation of the most 
productive sectors of the economy in order to increase their productivity and international 
competitiveness. Inflation fell from four to single digit figures and there was an 
unprecedented economic boom. Per capita GDP increased by 40 percent between 1990 and 
1998, exports more than doubled, and the economy expanded by 60 percent.60 
 
Menem won re-election in 1995 essentially campaigning on the fact of Argentina’s newfound 
economic stability. This was not to last, however, as the country’s deficit worsened (partly 
due to excessive borrowing necessary to back ‘convertibility’) and when the country entered 
into a prolonged recession around 1995-1996 – precipitated by the knock-on effects of global 
financial crises – its fiscal base began to erode unstoppably. This inexorably weakened the 
government, which effectively found itself in a situation where it had very few credible policy 
options to exercise in order to try and roll back the recession without causing a profound 
shock to the country’s economy, since due to ‘convertibility’ it had little control over fiscal 
policy – indeed, this was de facto in the hands of the head of the US Federal Reserve, Alan 
Greenspan – which meant that it could not lower interest rates to attempt to mitigate the 
effects of the recession that hit it in the second half of the 1990s.61 The country’s mounting 
fiscal problems were accompanied by a sharp rise in unemployment, as well as the increasing 
pauperisation of a large swathe of the population and a dramatic rise in inequalities. 
Unemployment rose from 6 percent in 1991 to 15 percent in 1997, the percentage of the 
population under the poverty line increased from 17 percent in 1993 to 26 percent in 1998, 
and income disparities rose dramatically, with the poorest 10 percent of the population 
sharing 21.5 percent of national income in 1990 but only 1.5 percent in 1999.62  
 
De la Rúa’s election to the presidency in 1999 on the Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la 
Educación (Alliance for Work, Justice, and Education) ticket was widely considered a signal 
that the Argentinean electorate wanted a change of direction. The Alianza was a coalition of 
two forces, on the one hand the UCR, which had now been in opposition for ten years, and the 
Frente del País Solidario (Frepaso), a centre- left coalition founded in 1993 of anti-Menem 
Peronists, dissident Radicals, Socialists, Christian Democrats, ex-Communists, as well as a 
variety of local community leaders, militants, and human rights activists. Although the extent 
to which the Radicals constituted a force for change is debatable, the Frepaso certainly 
embodied this potential, and the 1999 elections generated widespread expectations as a result. 
However, the Alianza was very much an alliance of convenience, and proved unable to 
convert itself from an electoral to a governing coalition, partly because it failed to properly 
institutionalise decision-making processes within the alliance, but also because personalised 
forms of organisation continued to predominate in both the UCR and the Frepaso, although in 
different ways. The UCR was a traditional Argentinean political party, constituted of 
caudillos with clientelistic power bases (indeed, it was and still is dominated by ex-President 
Raúl Alfonsín), while Frepaso represented a new, more free-floating kind of political party, 
                                                 
60 Manzetti (2002). 
61 Manzetti (2002). 
62 CEPAL (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe), Anuario estadístico de América Latina y el 
Caribe, Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, 2004; Galasso & Ravallion (2003); Nora Lustig, La crisis y la incidencia de 
la pobreza: macroeconomía socialmente responsable, Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 
2000; and figures from the Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos (INDEC), at http://www.indec.mecon.ar/ . 
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which in addition to being very much Buenos Aires-based, had very little in the way of a 
party apparatus or territorial base and relied much more on the charismatic aura of its leaders 
– including in particular Carlos ‘Chacho’ Alvarez and Graciela Fernández Meijide – and 
access to media for turning out the vote. 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, within less than a year of taking office, the Alianza had split, with 
the Frepaso passing into the opposition, leaving de la Rúa and the UCR to govern alone. 
Following Frepaso’s departure, de la Rúa resorted to increasingly desperate measures to shore 
up the country’s failing economy within the constraints of the existing economic model. This 
culminated in his installing Domingo Cavallo, the architect of Menem’s economic reforms 
including ‘convertibility’, as Finance Minister. Cavallo’s first action was to institute a ‘zero 
deficit’ plan, which included a 30 percent cut in the salaries and pensions of all state workers 
earning more than 500 pesos. The anger at these measures was palpable in the October 2001 
elections, which saw what was left of the Alianza lose heavily to the PJ, although the most 
significant result of the elections was perhaps the so-called ‘voto bronca’, or ‘angry vote’, 
which saw an unprecedented number of spoiled and blank votes (21 percent of all votes), as 
well as a high rate of absenteeism (25 percent, despite voting being obligatory in Argentina), 
both of which arguably signalled a generalised rejection of ‘politics as usual’. Despite this 
clear political slap in the face, the de La Rúa government continued to implement increasingly 
desperate measures to try to stabilise the economy, which – to a large extent prompted by a 
process of capital flight that on 30 November 2001 saw US$1.3 billion withdrawn from 
Argentinean banks in 24 hours and the country’s reserves slumping to a mere US$1.7 billion 
– culminated in a decree installing what became known as the ‘corralito’ (the playpen), a 
measure that limited cash withdrawals from bank accounts to 250 pesos per week and 
transfers abroad to 1,000 pesos per month. This hit the poor and the middle class particularly 
hard, and led to three weeks of civil strife which ultimately culminated in the Argentinazo. 
 
Although the Argentinazo was arguably a process rather than an event, in the Argentinean 
collective consciousness it concerns principally 19-20 December 2001. At 11pm on the 
evening of the 19th, following a day of rioting and looting in the provinces, De la Rúa took 
everybody by surprise by announcing on national television that he was declaring a state of 
emergency. His intervention, coming after two years of ineffective government and constant 
denials that something was wrong with the state of the country, was the spark for the largest 
mass demonstration ever to occur in Argentina, as hundreds of thousands of people in Buenos 
Aires and its surrounding suburbs spontaneously converged on the Plaza de Mayo and the 
Presidential palace, many angrily banging pots and pans (a traditional form of protest known 
in Argentina as ‘cacerolazo’) in order to vocally signal their discontent, crying slogans of 
protest including the emblematic anti-politician slogan “que se vayan todos, que no quede ni 
uno solo” (“out with the lot of them, not a single one must remain”), which rapidly became a 
universal rallying cry. The protest brought together men and women, young and old, crowds 
from shanty towns, middle-class families, organised groups of the unemployed known as 
‘piqueteros’, trade unionists, human rights activists, academics, businessmen, shopkeepers, 
street cleaners, and more. As people continued to take to the streets, at 1am on the 20th 
Domingo Cavallo resigned. At the same time, the police began to attempt to disperse the 
crowds, which rapidly lead to violent repression during which twenty-nine demonstrators 
were killed, hundreds injured and arrested, and which caused even greater numbers to 
mobilise in indignation. In the early morning of the 20th, De la Rúa resigned the presidency 
and fled the presidential palace in a helicopter, creating a power vacuum. The country was 
wracked by uncertainty and continuing protests for the better part of two weeks, until Eduardo 
Duhualde was installed as president on 1 January 2002. 
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As Marcela López Levy remarks, the Argentinazo was: 
a heady time steeped in a sense of shared destiny when people bypassed politics 
as usual. …It was a spontaneous uprising nobody had called for and no 
organisation could take credit for. The moment of overflowing rage is 
remembered now as …the time when the majority said ‘Enough’!”. 63  
Exactly what the Argentineans were saying ‘enough’ to is a complex question, however. 
There were clearly a number of intertwined issues. One obvious factor that the demonstrators 
were protesting against was certainly the increasing pauperisation of Argentinean society and 
in particular the economic erosion of its traditionally very large middle class. Another 
important factor was, in a context of increasing economic disparities and rising 
unemployment, a marked decline in the high levels of social mobility that had characterised 
Argentinean society since the turn of the twentieth century. But more importantly than either, 
perhaps, and as was reflected in the slogan ‘que se vayan todos’, Argentineans were arguably 
marking their profound disillusion with politics and politicians. At the same time, however, 
this protest implicitly constituted a challenge not only to politicians and political parties, but 
also to the ineffectiveness – and the absence of horizontal and vertical accountability – of 
existing institutional (i.e. state-based) channels of political representation and governance in 
Argentina. As protests and demonstrations continued unabated into the first quarter of 2002,64 
they increasingly began to take on new forms, ranging from the constitution of cooperatives 
and land occupations by piqueteros and acts of vandalism against banks by ‘ahorristas’ 
(individuals who savings were first blocked in the banks and then effectively devalued when 
their accounts were forcibly converted from dollars to pesos), to the establishment of 
‘asambleas populares’ (spontaneous neighbourhood assemblies) and ‘clubes de trueque’ 
(barter clubs), as well as the spread of ‘empresas recuperadas’ (‘recovered’ – i.e. worker-
occupied – enterprises),65 all of which arguably constituted themselves in opposition to a 
deficient Argentinean state. 
 
                                                 
63 M. López Levy, We Are Millions: Neo-liberalism and New Forms of Political Action in Argentina, London: 
Latin America Bureau, 2004, pp.10-11. 
64 According to Petras, between two and three millions Argentines participated in some kind of public protest 
during the first half of 2002 (J. Petras, ‘Argentina: 18 Months of Popular Struggle – A Balance’, Social Policy, 
34:1 (2003)). Levels of social engagement in Argentina have since dropped dramatically, however, as many of 
the varied forms of protest clearly constituted temporary ‘moments in time’ that peaked almost immediately 
within the first six months of 2002 before beginning to lose ground in the latter half of that year, and in an even 
more accelerated manner through 2003 and 2004. To a certain extent this has been due to the very heterogeneity 
of these diverse forms of protest, and the fact that they often represented very particular interests. But perhaps 
more importantly it can be said that since about the middle of 2003 Argentina has more or less ‘normalised’. In 
March 2003, bank accounts were unfrozen and although most of those who had mobilised in protest lost out due 
to the devaluation and forcible conversion of dollar accounts into peso accounts, many decided to simply take 
the blow to their savings and determine how best to maximise what was left. The socio-economic situation of the 
country similarly begun to pick up, both at the macroeconomic level, with the national growth rate for 2003 
reaching over 10 percent, as well as at the microeconomic level, with the proportion of the population under the 
poverty line falling significantly, from 57 percent in October 2002 to 48 percent in October 2003 
(http://www.latinnews.com, 2004). Politically, the election of Nestor Kirchner to the Presidency in April 2003 – 
the first nationwide election to be held post-December 2001 – also signalled something of a return to 
‘normality’. While many predicted a huge ‘voto bronca’ (angry vote) and there were multiple calls for voters to 
abstain, the number of spoiled and blank votes was less than 2 percent and 79 percent of the electorate voted, 
which certain commentators interpreted as indicating that people were willing to engage with the formal political 
system again. 
65 See, for example , López Levy (2004) for a particularly good overview. 
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Seen in this way, it can be contended that in many ways what the Argentinazo more 
profoundly reflected was a fundamental breakdown in state-society relations in Argentina. As 
Atul Kohli and Elisabeth Shue highlight, the interconnection between state and society is 
arguably one of the most fundamental relations constituting the structure of sociological 
reality in the modern era.66 It is of course a highly variable connection, as neither the state nor 
society are monolithic entities, and the boundaries between the two are generally blurred 
(indeed, there is a tendency for state-society interaction to be inherently ‘recursive’, or in 
other words, mutually transforming). Moreover, state-society relations are not necessarily 
always obvious, often encompassing both direct forms of connection as well as more indirect 
ones. The dynamics of this relationship are therefore frequently opaque, and the ways in 
which it can break down even less clear. Yet it is arguably of critical importance to 
understanding the predicament of contemporary Argentina, where it can be contended that 
there has occurred a fundamental shift in the nature of state-society relations during the past 
two decades, with the Argentinazo constituting the point of culmination of this alteration.  
 
The transformation of state-society relations in Argentina can be related firstly to the post-
1983 failure to create sustainable institutional configurations of the state able to effectively 
channel democratic political competition, participation and representation due to the spread of 
a “politics of informality”.67 This was reflected not only at the level of party politics, but also 
in relation to the wider polity, including perhaps most paradigmatically the lack of response to 
demands that perpetrators of human rights violations during the military dictatorship (1976-
1983) be held legally accountable.68 Also important to understanding the process of 
breakdown of state-society relations in contemporary Argentina is the Argentinean state’s 
declining ability to fulfil certain socially expected socio-economic functions over the past 
twenty years. As Guillermo Cortés and Adriana Marshall highlight, one of the most 
significant characteristics of post-Second World War Argentina is that it had a working 
welfare state based on the universal provision of public education and health, as well as a 
social security system linked to full employment and backed up by protective labour laws, 
that continued well beyond the global crisis of the early 1970s that signalled the end of the 
welfare state model elsewhere around the world.69 Partly as a result of this exceptionalism, 
there exists within contemporary Argentinean society a deep and widespread attitude that the 
state is the privileged vehicle for social justice.70 The Argentinean welfare state began to 
unravel in the 1990s, as the Menem government’s economic policies eroded the state’s 
institutional and financial capacities – already weakened by the widespread ‘politics of 
informality’ – which meant that the state became increasingly unable to fulfil its expected 
welfare functions in a context of increasing poverty and unemployment where these functions 
were becoming increasingly urgent.71 
                                                 
66 A. Kohli & E. Shue, ‘State Power and Social Forces: On Political Contention and Accommodation in the 
Third World’, in J. Migdal et al. (eds), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the 
Third World, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. See also Evans (1995) and Manor (1991). 
67 Tedesco (2002). 
68 See Peruzzotti (2002) for a discussion of this point. 
69 R. Cortés & A. Marshall, ‘Estrategia económica, instituciones y negociación política en la reforma social de 
los ‘90’, Desarrollo Económico, 39:154 (1999). 
70 This is of course also linked historically to the political ideology of Peronism – see, for example, J. Auyero, 
Poor People's Politics. Peronist Networks and the Legacy of Evita, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001; 
and D. James, Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class, 1946-1976 , Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
71 The changing nature of the Argentinean economy and the state’s increasing inability to respond were clearly at 
odds with the “social imaginary” (C. Taylor, ‘Modern Social Imaginaries’, Public Culture, 14 (2002), pp.49-90), 
as was succinctly encapsulated in a conversation I had with a ‘remis’ (unlicensed taxicab) driver in the poor 
Greater Buenos Aires suburb of La Matanza in June 2003. We were talking about the economic situation in 
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Another way of looking at this process would be in terms of a ‘disbundling’ of formal and 
substantive citizenship rights. T. H. Marshall defines citizenship as “a status bestowed on 
those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect 
to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed”. 72 However, he makes a distinction 
between formal and substantive aspects of citizenship, with the former referring to civic rights 
such as membership within a political community, while the latter refer to the array of socio-
economic rights that individuals possess and can exercise, thereby providing them with the 
means through which to operationalise their formal citizenship. Meaningful citizenship is 
therefore constituted through the ‘bundling’ of formal and substantive rights in such a way 
that they interact and mutually reinforce each other, as formal rights alone are not sufficient to 
guarantee effective citizenship, while substantive rights by themselves do not provide a basis 
through which to exercise what Albert Hirschman calls “voice”. 73 At the same time, Marshall 
underlined how socio-economic inequalities undermine the ability of people to coherently 
express their agency in a way that political powerlessness in a context where socio-economic 
rights are met does not. From this perspective, it can be argued that although the 1980s saw an 
undermining of formal political rights in Argentina, due to the spread of the ‘politics of 
informality’, it was not until the 1990s and the weakening of socio-economic rights, both as a 
result of the rise in unemployment, inequality, and the decline in social mobility, as well as 
the erosion of the welfare state, that state-society relations in Argentina properly began to 
unravel, accelerating until reaching breaking point in December 2001 and the Argentinazo.74 
 
 
The politics of participatory budgeting in Buenos Aires 
The introduction and implementation of Participatory Budgeting (PB – or ‘presupuesto 
participativo’) in Buenos Aires has to be first and foremost understood against the context of 
the socio-political fracture that culminated in the Argentinazo. Notwithstanding Ana 
Dinerstein’s somewhat optimistic assertion that “Argentina has become a political laboratory” 
in the wake of the Argentinazo,75 with a groundswell of unprecedented bottom-up grassroots 
mobilisation forcing the establishment of new forms of political organisation, PB was very 
                                                                                                                                                        
general, and he began to tell me how he had been unemployed for three years after the factory he had been 
working for went bankrupt. I asked him how long ago that had been, and he answered June 2000. Doing the 
maths quickly in my head, I congratulated him on having recently secured work again driving a remis. He 
replied forcefully that he had been driving the remis for two and a half years now, but that it could not in any 
way be considered a proper job, because his salary was not fixed, he did not have the right to a paid annual 
holiday, he received no social security or pension contributions from the remis  owner, there was not state 
regulation of his job, etc. Compared to most of the rest of Latin America, such expectations were obviously very 
high ones but reflected well the particular nature of Argentinean state-society relations and starkly illustrate the 
rupture that arguably crystallized in the Argentinazo . 
72 T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1950, p.92. 
73 A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. 
74 Another plausible analogy would be to conceive the Argentinazo  as representing the culmination of a process 
similar to what Polanyi characterised as the “double movement” of history, with a disaggregation of the 
Argentinean state-society relations – roughly corresponding to what Polanyi termed the “disembedding” of the 
economic from the political – on the one hand, and a concomitant social reaction against this process on the 
other (K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time , Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1944). 
75 A. Dinerstein, ‘“Que se vayan todos!” Popular Insurrection and the Asambleas Barriales in Argentina’, 
Bulletin of Latin American Research, 22:2 (April 2003), p.187. 
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explicitly a ‘top-down’, ad hoc response to the Argentinazo by the Government of the City of 
Buenos Aires (GCBA), as the official 2003 information brochure on the process makes clear: 
We live in an epoch in which the institutions of democracy lack representation 
and legitimacy in unprecedented ways. The citizenry demands new answers, new 
channels of accountability and participation, new ways of doing politics. Bridging 
the gap that today separates the State from society is the key to maintaining a fully 
democratic life. In this context, the Government of the Autonomous City of 
Buenos Aires has opened a space for the direct participation of local 
neighbourhood inhabitants in public affairs. The Participatory Budget Plan has the 
objective of canalising the demands of society and granting citizens a central role 
in the democratic life of the City. Citizen participation is the best means possible 
to attain a more democratic control over the Government’s administration of the 
City. 76 
To this extent, PB can be said to have constituted a form of crisis management on the part of 
the GCBA in the face of the Argentinazo. In many ways, considering the profound nature of 
the Argentinean crisis as a manifestation of the disconnection between state and society as 
well as the underlying logic and aim of EDD, it can even be said to have constituted a rather 
logical one. 
 
At the same time, PB was by no means an obvious initiative to implement in the face of the 
crisis. The origins of the concept of PB in Buenos Aires can be traced to the Central de 
Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA – Argentinean Workers’ Central), an independent trade union 
founded in the late 1980s. It essentially seems to have been the lovechild of one man, Claudio 
Lozano, at the  time head of a CTA think-tank, the Instituto de Estudios y Formación (IEF – 
Institute of Studies and Training), who encountered PB on a fact- finding mission to Porto 
Alegre in 1994, and had come back extremely enthused with the whole process. The CTA’s 
web-based documentation clearly reflects the fact that the CTA’s enthusiasm for PB is due 
not only to its potential as a means of social empowerment that is in correspondence with the 
leftwing values espoused by the CTA, but also its manifest promise as a powerful means of 
political mobilisation and raising consciousness. Indeed, the web-based documentation makes 
frequent mention of the important role PB had played in the electoral success of the Brazilian 
Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabhaldores – PT). From 1995 onwards, the CTA organised 
workshops, lectures, and seminars about PB, published documents about PB, and even 
produced a video about the experience of PB in Brazil. However, despite this proliferation of 
outputs they seem to have had a limited impact, except in one major respect: the CTA 
significantly influenced the nature of the 1996 constitution that established Buenos Aires as 
an autonomous city by successfully lobbying not only for the inclusion of PB, but indeed 
making participatory democracy the keystone of the constitution. 77  
 
Indeed, the concept of participation thoroughly pervades the Constitution of the Autonomous 
City of Buenos Aires, which is arguably one of the most progressive in Latin America. Article 
1 of the constitution opens by declaring that the city government “organises its autonomous 
institutions as participatory democracy”, 78 and participation is explicitly referred to in a 
                                                 
76 GCBA (Gobierno de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires – Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos 
Aires), Presupuesto Participativo: Una Realidad, Buenos Aires: GCBA, 2003a, p.4, my translation. 
77 Although to a certain extent this seems to have been at least partly due to the force of personality and powers 
of negotiation of the CTA delegate to the Constitution-writing Constituent Assembly, Martin Hourest. 
78 GCBA (Gobierno de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires – Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos 
Aires), Constitución de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, 5th edition, Buenos Aires: Ediciones del País, 
2003b, p.7. 
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further 15 out of a total 140 articles.79 Article 52 relates specifically to PB: “The participatory 
character of the budget is established. The law will fix the consultative procedures regarding 
the assignation of resource priorities”. 80 However, while there is extensive mention of 
participation in the constitution, it should be noted that its concrete institutiona lisation has 
been much less obvious, particularly in relation to PB. The law referred to in article 52, which 
was to establish the practical procedural mechanisms for PB, was supposed to have been 
ratified before the end of 2001, but none of the various legal projects proposed have been 
voted on by the City Legislature,81 and the present PB process is actually legislated for by 
decree.82 In 1999, the CTA organised the Multisectorial de Organizaciones Sociales por la 
Democracia Participativa (MOSDePa – Multi-sector Coalition of Social Organisations for 
Participatory Democracy), a convergence of 30 NGOs of varying size and importance, in 
order to try to better promote the implementation of PB. The results were clearly rather 
limited – particularly in relation to the GCBA – as a May 2001 CTA document on PB rather 
pathetically reflects as it somewhat plaintively calls on the citizens of Buenos Aires to 
exercise their right to trigger a referendum on the issue of PB by collecting petitions with 
signatures equivalent to a total of 0.5 percent of the city’s electoral roll.83 
 
In other words, although PB was not completely unknown in Buenos Aires – a small number 
of limited PB pilot projects were carried out on a local basis in different parts of the city in 
1997-98, 1998 and 2001, principally through collaborations between the GCBA and NGOs84 – 
                                                 
79 These are articles 11, 21, 24, 27, 29, 32, 34, 38, 39, 40, 46, 47, 52, 58, and 104. 
80 GCBA (2003b), p.19. 
81 See Romero (2001) for an overvie w of eight of these. 
82 At the same time, articles 9, 10 and 29 of the 1998 administrative law regulating the procedures for 
establishing the annual City budget – the Ley 70 de Sistemas de Gestión, Administración Financiera y Control 
del Sector Público (Law 70 concerning Systems of Public Sector Management, Financial Administration and 
Control) – explicitly refer to the participatory nature of the city’s budgeting process, and mention that this will be 
achieved through “foros temáticos y zonales” to determine “prioridades de asignación de recursos” through “la 
consulta a la población en el proceso de elaboración y seguimiento”, which is effectively the basis upon which 
participatory budgeting in Buenos Aires has been established. It should be noted that art icle 127 of the 
constitution also provides for the eventual division of the city into “communes”, which are to be participatory in 
their modes of governance. Although several laws relating to the communes have been proposed, none have 
been ratified, principally due to bickering over the delineation of the boundaries of the future communes, which 
is of course a profoundly political issue as the division of the city would disturb the existing political balance. 
83  E. Arceo, El Presupuesto Participativo en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires: Instituto de Estudios 
sobre Estado y Participación (IDEP)-Asociación de Trabajadores del Estado (ATE) & Central de Trabajadores 
Argentinos (CTA), 2001.Three other early adherents and promoters of PB were the NGO Poder Ciudadano 
(Citizen Power), the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO – Latin American Faculty of 
Social Sciences) led Redes de Planificación Participativa y Gestión Asociada (Co-governance and Participatory 
Planning networks), and the Centro de Implementación de Políticas Públicas para la Equidad y el Crecimiento 
(CIPPEC – Centre for the Implementation of Public Policies for Equity and Growth). They seem, however, to 
have been much less influential and certainly less visible than the CTA in promoting PB. Nevertheless, together 
with the CTA, these four organisations were invited to become organisational members of the Consejo 
Provisorio del Presupuesto Participativo (Participatory Budgeting Provisional Council) when this was set up in 
September 2002, due to their historical links with the promotion of PB in Buenos Aires.  
84 The 1997-98 pilot project was a very limited and schematic application of PB with 101 inhabitants of the La 
Boca and Barracas neighbourhoods of the CGP no. 3 (the CGPs – Centros de Gestión y Participación, or 
‘Administration and Participation Centres’, are decentralised administrative units within the city of Buenos 
Aires; there are sixteen in all). The 1998 experience consisted of participatory workshops with representatives of 
civil society in the neighbourhoods of Agronomía (CGP no. 11), Monserrat (CGP no. 1), Palermo (CGP no. 14 
Este), Saavedra (CGP no. 12), and Villa Luro (CGP no. 7), which reportedly failed to produce results. In 2001 a 
full scale PB pilot project was carried out over the course of one month in the CGP no. 13 (Belgrano-Nuñez), 
with the assistance of the ex-Mayor of Porto Alegre, Raúl Pont (Navarro, 2004). For a detailed description of the 
1997-98 project in La Boca and Barracas, as well as the 1998 workshops, see Goday, L., ‘Presupuesto 
Participativo en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires: Primera Experiencia en La Argentina’, article published in the 
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it definitely did not rate very high in terms of political visibility when the Argentinazo 
occurred. How, then, did it come to be implemented in 2002? In order to answer this question, 
it is necessary to delve beyond the Argentinazo and consider the historical emergence of the 
Frente Grande (Large Front) and Frepaso political parties in Buenos Aires during the early to 
mid-1990, their integration into the Alianza in 1996, and the subsequent break-up of the 
Alianza. Prior to 1993, although there were a veritable plethora of other parties, it can be said 
that there were basically two predominating political forces in the city, the UCR and the PJ. In 
1993, the Frente Grande was formed when a small group of PJ congressmen, who were later 
to be called ‘los Ocho’ or ‘Group of Eight’, expressed their disquiet over the direction the 
Menem administration was taking and decided to find a means of challenging Menemismo 
from outside the PJ. 
 
The ‘Group of Eight’ rapidly built alliances with others feeling dissatisfaction for the 
hegemonic economic model, and together established a programmatic platform emphasising 
the growing social problems of Argentina, the need for a renewal of politics, and highlighting 
ethical problems surrounding corruption and the institutional weakness of the Argentinean 
state. By December 1994, what had originally simply been eight dissident Peronists had 
swollen to include more dissident Peronists, Socialists, Christian Democrats, ex-Communists, 
dissident Radicals (some of whom were gathered under the banner of the wonderfully named 
Partido Intransigente, or Intransigent Party, founded as a Radical splinter group in the 1950s, 
and also those opposed to Raúl Alfonsín, who despite the hapless end to his presidency in 
1989 had retained a strong grip on the UCR), as well as a variety of local community leaders, 
trade unionists, militants of all ilk, and human rights activists. Much of the anger that brought 
this disparate group together was fuelled by the so-called Pacto de los Olivos (Olivos Pact) 
between the UCR leader Raúl Alfonsín and the PJ President Carlos Menem, whereby they 
agreed to reform the constitution in order to allow Menem to run for a second term, while 
guaranteeing the largest losing minority party in provincial elections an automatic 
parliamentary or senatorial seat (something that would effectively give the Radicals a 
permanent quota of power outside urban areas), as well as the principle of autonomy for the 
city of Buenos Aires (essentially turning it into an extra province which the Radicals were 
theoretically likely to dominate considering their historical domination of the city). The 
Frente Grande, or rather Frepaso as it was now called, was the lone dissenting organisational 
voice against this bipartisan pact between the two dominating parties, and its standing rose 
accordingly. In the May 1995 presidential elections, the Frepaso candidate, dissident Peronist 
senator José Octavio Bordón, finished second behind Menem with 30 percent, beating the 
UCR to an unprecedented third place as they turned in their worst ever electoral showing with 
less than 17 percent of the vote. 
 
Although this seemed to be an encouraging result, Frepaso now found itself at a crossroads. 
Frepaso was fundamentally different from the two traditional Argentinean parties in that it did 
not have much of a national party structure and very little in the way of a militant base. 
Indeed, Luis Alberto Romero has called it “a party of leaders”, 85 depending to a large extent 
on the charisma of its principle figures, such as Bordón – who in fact ended up rejoining the 
PJ shortly after the 1995 elections – Carlos ‘Chacho’ Alvarez (originally a dissident Peronist), 
or Graciela Fernández Meijide (a prominent human rights activist). Partly because of this, 
Frepaso’s votes had come disproportionately from urban middle class voters, and it hardly 
                                                                                                                                                        
Revista de la Asociación Argentina de Presupuesto , mimeo, December 1999; and for comments specifically on 
the 2001 pilot project in the CGP no. 13, see Romero (2001). 
85 L. A. Romero, A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2002. 
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existed across large swathes of the interior of the country. Moreover, many of the voters were 
clearly not long-term converts but UCR-sympathizers who were punishing their party for the 
Olivos Pact. However, faced with the long-haul enterprise of creating a strong and viable third 
party or the possibility of more immediately rewarding returns, the Frepaso leadership  
decided on the latter and began exploring the prospects of a partnership with the still bruised 
and reeling UCR.  
 
The result was the Alianza, formed in 1996. The combination of the charisma of Frepaso 
leaders and its anti-establishment bent with the old and efficient Radical party machine 
proved irresistible, and it was no surprise when the Alianza won the first congressional 
elections it contested in 1997. The coalition then prepared for a run at the presidency in 1999. 
There were two obvious frontrunners for the nomination, the Radical Fernando de la Rúa who 
had recently been elected mayor of Buenos Aires on the one hand, and Graciela Fernández 
Meijide, now a Frepaso senator and still one of its most prominent figures, on the other. It was 
eventually decided that the Alianza would hold open primaries to decide who would be their 
presidential candidate, which effectively handed the nomination to de la Rúa, Frepaso not 
having the constituency-mobilising local- level apparatus that the UCR had. Following 
Fernández Meijide’s withdrawal, the vice-presidential Alianza slot went to ‘Chacho’ Alvarez, 
the original leader of the Group of Eight that had come together as the Frente Grande, and 
now also a major figure of Frepaso. 
 
The de la Rúa-Alvarez team campaigned on three major issues: the elimination of corruption 
and the promise of transparency, ending the economic recession, and finally, promising 
growth with equity. The Alianza coalition won handsomely, but was strained almost 
immediately upon taking power. There were big differences between the UCR and Frepaso 
ideologies, and they had not agreed on the policies to put into application in any detail. De la 
Rúa rapidly decided to push Frepaso into the background, offering it just two second-tier 
cabinet posts in his government and manoeuvring to isolate ‘Chacho’ Alvarez. At the same 
time, however, these tensions did not prevent the Alianza from winning the mayorship of 
Buenos Aires in 2000, this time with a Frepaso candidate called Aníbal Ibarra, who had 
previously led the Alianza group in the City Legislature in 1996-2000. However, in late 2000, 
less than a year after the Alianza had come to power, a scandal broke out due to the Minister 
of Labour bribing Peronist senators to ensure the easy passage of a bill in the upper house 
which the Alianza did not control. ‘Chacho’ Alvarez – who had made the fight against 
corruption his trademark – asked for the resignation of the Minister of Labour and other close 
presidential aides involved. De la Rúa refused, and moreover reshuffled his cabinet in a way 
that explicitly rewarded those that Alvarez had denounced. ‘Chacho’ Alvarez resigned, and 
Frepaso, which was heavily reliant on its high profile and popular leader, abandoned 
government. This fundamentally altered the nature of the government, and de la Rúa 
desperately tried to build new coalitions, but these failed to stem the tide and ultimately 
culminated in the Argentinazo and his resignation. 
 
These events form a critical backdrop to understanding why and how PB came to be 
introduced in Buenos Aires in 2002. ‘Chacho’ Alvarez’s resignation saw him to all intents 
and purposes withdraw from public political life, and critics within the Alianza in Buenos 
Aires – including within his own party, Frepaso – charged him with political irresponsibility 
for having resigned impetuously and contributed to destabilising de la Rúa’s government. The 
resulting effective collapse of the Alianza at the national level was mirrored at the city level, 
but its effects were in some ways worse, as Aníbal Ibarra, the Frepaso mayor of Buenos Aires 
elected on an Alianza ticket, had been a close ally of ‘Chacho’ Alvarez, and the latter’s 
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resignation deprived him of his major political support both within Frepaso and in relation to 
the wider population. The fact that the Alianza was disintegrating complicated the situation 
even more for Ibarra, as the city of Buenos Aires political apparatus was essentially controlled 
by the UCR, and a nervous Frepaso began to fragment in the face of uncertainty. 
 
Ibarra therefore faced an urgent and delicate task of rebuilding a territorial support base for 
himself within Buenos Aires. He rapidly began to build bridges both across the spectrum of 
political groups that made up Frepaso, trying to pull the party back together again, as well as 
reaching out beyond in order to broker new sources of support. He did so especially through a 
personal style, cultivating friendships, connections, and relations. In particular, he managed to 
broker an alliance with a wing of the Buenos Aires UCR led by Gabriela Gonzalez Gass, 
whom he appointed Secretary for Social Affairs in his government in November 2001, hoping 
that she would be able to swing a significant proportion of the Radical- leaning local 
organisations in his favour in the 2003 mayorship elections. Gonzalez Gass however promptly 
lost the Buenos Aires UCR primaries to select the party’s candidate for the elections to 
Christian Caram, and found herself in the political wilderness (as well as something of a lame 
duck in Ibarra’s government). The events of December 2001 complicated matters further for 
Ibarra. To add to his problems of being a politician elected to office on a ticket that was now 
associated with a fallen government, having no figure of national stature supporting him, and 
lacking a territorial power base in Buenos, Ibarra found himself facing massive popular 
mobilisation that threatened to bring his government down. At this point Ibarra started trying 
to pull together a much wider range of political affiliations into his orbit. 
 
He in particular refocused on the Frepaso, which in the wake of the Argentinazo underwent a 
severe process of fragmentation as several smaller groups incorporating the coalition decided 
to strike out alone in the wider context of political uncertainty, although the major coalition 
partners stayed together within a group that readopted the name Frente Grande. However, 
Ibarra’s task was complicated by the fact that the recomposed Frente Grande was divided into 
three currents. The first of these was a group called the Movimiento de Justicia Social 
(MODEJUSO – Social Justice Movement), a combination of various leftwing Peronists. The 
historic leader of this group had been ‘Chacho’ Alvarez, and since his resignation a variety of 
lower level local leaders were in the process of asserting themselves but none of them making 
much headway, although in some cases they were very well implanted at the local level. The 
second group was known as ‘La Banda’ (‘The Gang’),86 and included mainly Radical 
dissidents (in particular those associated with the Partido Intransigente) and was led by Raúl 
Fernández. The last group was a loose congregation called the Grupo Espacio Abierto (Open 
Space Group), which had coalesced around the ex-communist Ariel Schifrin, who was the ex-
leader of the Alianza bloc in the City Legislature.  
 
Ibarra had links with all three groups but decided to make overtures to the Grupo Espacio 
first, partly prompted by his historic links with Schifrin, with whom he had been to university 
and had joined the Communist party in his youth (although Ibarra subsequently quickly left it, 
while Schifrin went on to become a major party political operator). Moreover, Schifrin had 
served as administrative secretary to the City Legislature in 1996-2000, and had effectively 
been Ibarra’s right-hand man when he had been head of the City Legislature. Ibarra therefore 
offered Schifrín a place in his government in order to secure his support and that of his group, 
which Schifrín agreed to but only on the condition tha t he be put in charge of what was then 
the sub-Secretariat of Decentralization and Citizen Participation – but was quickly upgraded 
                                                 
86 I was never able to discover the reasons for this name. 
 21
to the Secretaría de Descentralización y Participación Ciudadana (Secretariat for 
Decentralization and Citizen Participation) – and that he be permitted to implement PB. 
Although initially sceptical, Ibarra was won over by Schifrín’s arguments that firstly, PB 
could constitute a means of ‘pacifying’ the masses, and secondly that if it worked like it 
worked in Porto Alegre, it could only strengthen the Frente Grande’s, and therefore Ibarra’s, 
re-election chances. Schifrín took up his post in February 2002, and moved quickly to 
implement PB. Schifrin of course had his own agenda for implementing PB, namely to use it 
as a means of consolidating and expanding Grupo Espacio Abierto political networks in order 
to establish a coherent and stable local territorial base for the group. This in particular meant 
displacing or co-opting UCR local organisations – the historically dominant ones in the city – 
and Schifrin began to insert loyalists into Buenos Aires CGPs in order to begin processes of 
localised networking through the PB process.87 Many of these loyalists were indeed special 
PB delegates who were generally linked either to the Grupo Espacio Abierto or the 
MODEJUSO, with whom Schifrin had begun to build bridges.88  
 
This manifest will towards the politicisation of the PB process notwithstanding, however, in 
many way it can be argued that to a large extent PB in Buenos Aires worked very well, at 
least during the first two years of its application, and generated a range of very positive 
effects. The PB process in Buenos Aires began with a limited one month Plan de Prioridades 
Barriales (Neighbourhood Priorities Plan) pilot project that was successfully carried out in 
June 2002. 4,500 individuals in 16 neighbourhoods participated in 250 meetings and 
identified 338 budgetary priorities that were then incorporated into a special annex of the 
city’s 2002 budget that was approved by the City Legislature. By May 2004, 165 of these 
priorities had been executed (49 percent), 101 were in the process of being executed (30 
percent), and 22 were being disputed (7 percent). A full scale Plan de Presupuesto 
Participativo 2003 (2003 PB Plan) followed this pilot project between July and September 
2002, where 9,450 individuals in 43 neighbourhoods participated in 450 meetings and voted 
189 priorities that were integrated into the city’s 2003 budget. By May 2004, 65 of these 
priorities had been executed (34 percent), 45 were in the process of being executed (24 
percent), and 10 were being disputed (5 percent). The Plan de Presupuesto Participativo 2004 
(2004 PB Plan) was carried out between July and September 2003 in 51 neighbourhoods. 
14,000 individuals participated in the identification and voting of 1,000 priorities, 600 of 
which were incorporated into the city’s 2004 budget (those that were not incorporated were 
rejected as unfeasible or inappropriate).89  
 
When considered against the backdrop of cut-backs and financial scarcity due to the economic 
crisis precipitated by the Argentinazo, the achievements of the PB process in Buenos Aires 
are arguably extremely impressive. To a certain extent, this can be partially attributed to 
intelligent institutional design. Like other PB processes, at its most basic, the Buenos Aires 
PB process was essentially a devolution of authority for the determination of municipal action 
from the city government to local neighbourhood inhabitants. These debated and established 
budgetary priorities in neighbourhood-specific participatory budgeting assemblies and 
                                                 
87 As one CGP employee – openly affiliated with the Grupo Espacio Abierto – told me in an interview: “the 
Open Space [Group] now has a better territorial development, precisely because Ariel is the Secretary of 
Decentralization and he’s worked the CGPs well, and of course the PB is a good tool to extend the presence of 
the party and impose ourselves at the local level, especially vis -à-vis the Radical” . 
88 In a revealing exchange with Ariel Schifrin in the City Legislature on 16 December 2002, the City legislator 
Sr. Mercado raised the question of a rumour that said that the PB process was being used to mobilise political 
groups and federate local political groups, and following Schifrin’s rather brief and dismissive denial that this 
was the case, accused him of being well-known for his shrewd Machiavellian political operating. 
89 Navarro (2004). 
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thematic commissions, which were then voted on. If the priorities voted on were judged 
feasible by a technical commission, the priorities that have been voted were then ranked and 
sorted out according to a formula that took into account population difference, percentage of 
voters, and the relative wealth and poverty of a neighbourhood, among other things, in order 
to put all neighbourhoods on an equal level.90 A ‘matrix’ for the whole city would then be 
drawn up, listing the priorities by rank, thereby providing the order in which city public 
resources must be expended until depleted. It is at this level that the PB process in Buenos 
Aires was crucially different from the Porto Alegre PB process, for example, in that it did not 
concern a specific sum of money but rather the specific actions of the city government, and as 
such avoided the likely problem that the lack of money would have probably meant that the 
PB would have received very little in the way of independent resources.91 
 
More generally, however, although the PB process suffered a number of teething and design-
related problems in its two rounds in 2002, by 2003 it really did seem to be generating a 
genuine sense of local autonomy and empowerment, and was certainly delivering at least 
some of the goods generally associated with such forms of EDD, for example constituting a 
valuable channel for communication and the rebuilding of trust between local neighbourhood 
groups and inhabitants on the one hand, and city government officials and bureaucrats on the 
other.92 This arguably had little to do with the institutional design of the process, which was 
actually either continuously being tinkered with by the Technical Coordination team or the 
council of locally elected neighbourhood representatives and NGOs representatives called the 
Consejo Provisorio del Presupuesto Participativo (PB Provisional Council) that theoretically 
supervises the whole PB process, or else was often ignored as they improvised in response to 
variable situations.  
 
In many ways, much more important to the success of the PB process was the actual nature of 
the composition of the Technical Coordination team. A number of members of the central 
team in the Secretariat and some of the key local teams based in the CGPs arguably shared 
what can be termed a certain ‘anti-politics’ outlook in that they saw themselves not as 
political activists but much more as government functionaries. This was more often than not 
linked to their generally very similar trajectories of disgruntled Frepaso militancy – and in 
many cases pre-Menem Peronism before that – which had seen them become disillusioned 
with politics, and turn to an ethos of public service instead, reinforced by the fact that many of 
them rapidly became converted to the PB process and its potential. Furthermore, both the 
central and localised coordination teams were traversed by small mini-networks of individuals 
who had known each other for a long time, either as friends, co-workers, or in some cases by 
having been on training courses together, and were therefore linked together by common 
outlooks and values that meant that they worked very effectively as a team. In many ways, 
following Sudipta Kaviraj, one could even go so far as to argue that the Technical 
Coordination team constituted something of a positive Trojan horse within the 
Decentralisation and Citizen Participation Secretariat, which as a result had been: 
                                                 
90 Although to a certain extent the PB process can be said to have been dominated by the middle classes, this 
reflected the middle class make -up of the city and moreover was not universally true, as PB assemblies were set 
up by the local authorities in many of the poorer areas of the city – including some of the poorest, such as the 
Villa 31 slum – and furthermore the authorities also targeted a substantial proportion of their meagre resources to 
reaching and mobilising the poor. 
91 In many ways, one could actually say that the Buenos Aires PB process was less an exercise in PB and more 
one in participatory planning. 
92 Although it should be noted that this varied considerably, with the responsiveness of bureaucrats to the PB 
process to a large extent depending on whether the head of the relevant department or secretariat was a political 
friend or enemy of Schifrin’s. 
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forced to recruit personnel from the groups who [spoke] and interpret[ed] the 
world in terms of [a different] discourse [to Schifrin’s politicising one]. Since 
major government policies have their final point of implementation very low 
down in the bureaucracy, [this latter vision was] reinterpreted beyond 
recognition. 93 
 
Other important factors to take into account, though, were the nature of local politics in 
Argentina and the balance of political power between Schifrin and Ibarra. In relation to the 
first of these, as Steven Levitsky has pointed out in a seminal article on the “organised 
disorganisation” of political parties in Argentina, there is arguably a missing middle ground in 
the country’s political panorama insofar as the PJ (though the same logic also applies to the 
UCR) can be conceived as an “informal mass party” based on: 
a dense collection of personal networks – operating out of unions, clubs, non-
governmental organisations, and often activists’ homes – that are often 
unconnected to (and autonomous from) the party bureaucracy. 94  
This meant that the politicisation of local networks by the Grupo Espacio Abierto was not 
quite as simple as it might have initially seemed. Certainly the PB process overlay a variety of 
existing social forms in the city. Buenos Aires is a city with very strong local neighbourhood 
identities, and each neighbourhood is populated by a constellation of civil society 
organisations, activist groups, cooperatives, etcetera. As both Steven Levitsky and Javier 
Auyero point out, these are the local- level organisations that informally constitute the base of 
traditional political parties, but they are in fact highly autonomous and difficult to federate 
coherently.95 Local- level ‘big men’ and ‘big women’ – variably called ‘referentes’, ‘punteros’ 
and ‘punteras’, or ‘manzaneras’, depending on the level at which they operate – all had their 
own agendas, of course: sometimes focused around obtaining resources; but often – 
particularly after a certain exposure to the process – actually wanting to engage in PB to its 
full potential. Neither of these necessarily coincided with Grupo Espacio Abierto interests, 
and nor did cases where local- level bosses saw in PB a potential means of consolidating their 
own positions (as was the case of certain politicised CGP directors).  
 
Furthermore, many individual local neighbourhood inhabitants engaging in the PB process 
saw in it a means of gaining access to government bureaucrats rather than politicians, as they 
were concerned to be able to talk to those who could concretely deal with their problems. 
Some enlightened government bureaucrats also enthusiastically embraced the process as a 
wonderful tool for determining exactly what local neighbourhood inhabitants wanted, which 
others, perhaps more cynically (and disruptively of Schifrin’s hopes to build up Grupo 
Espacio Abierto networks) saw in PB a means of resisting the demands of politicians, as 
clearly the voice of the people, as embodied in participatory budgeting, could be said to take 
precedence. The participatory budgeting initiative also overlay over other, more ‘bottom-up’ 
local- level organisational forms, including ones that had emerged as a result of the 
Argentinazo, such as the asambleas populares that sprung up all over Buenos Aires after 
December 2001. Although the vast majority of these disappeared within a year, according to a 
survey carried out by the CEOP research consultancy, 47 percent of participants in the 2002 
                                                 
93 S. Kaviraj, ‘On state, society, and discourse in India’, in J. Manor (ed), Rethinking Third World Politics, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, p.91. 
94 Levitsky (2001), p.30. 
95 Auyero (2001); and Levitsky (2001). 
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participatory budgeting process pilot project had participated regularly in asambleas 
populares.96  
 
Anecdotal evidence seemed to suggest that upwards of 25 percent of participants in the 2003 
participatory budget process had previously belonged to a neighbourhood assembly, with 
several saying that they felt a greater sense of actually being able to influence the 
management of their own city through the participatory budgeting process than they had had 
when they were simply debating in the asambleas populares (a point which further reinforces 
the idea that the neighbourhood assemblies were in some ways doomed to fail since they did 
not control anything substantial in terms of resources). This is not to suggest that the 
participatory budgeting process constituted an institutionalisation of asambleas populares, 
however. The overlap between them was small in institutional terms, and mainly occurred on 
an individual membership basis. A more accurate of portraying the relationship between the 
participatory budgeting assemblies and the popular neighbourhood assemblies is of the former 
institutionally superseded the latter. But the two are very different institutions, with the 
participatory budgeting neighbourhood assemblies being set up by the local authorities, while 
the asambleas populares were spontaneous. 
 
While such bottom-up ‘interference’ meant that the process of territorial construction of a 
political base for the Grupo Espacio Abierto progressed slowly, Schifrin was simultaneously 
also concerned with countering what he saw as the most important challenge to the Frente 
Grande in its quest for control of the city, namely the Radicals, and this frequently led to local 
standstills and compromises having to be reached which further prevented the effective 
politicisation of the PB process and provided it with space to operate within interference. 
Certainly, although the UCR was to a large extent moribund – failing spectacularly to garner a 
significant share of the votes in the presidential elections of April 2003 – the non-UCR 
Radical factions were displaying a certain vivacity, particularly those associated with the 
Partido Intransigente. Ibarra, always the consummate political operator with an eye to 
building bridges and alliances, moved to connect with these Radical groups, including in 
particular the so-called ‘Banda’, and he named their leader, Raúl Fernández, his Chief of 
Cabinet. This precipitated a conflict with Schifrin, although there is evidence to suggest that 
Ibarra was always somewhat wary of Schifrin and subtly trying to undermine his PB 
implementation efforts by providing the Decentralisation and Citizen Participation Secretariat 
with very little in the way of material resources to organise the process. Certainly, later public 
pronouncements by Ibarra suggest that he was never really a convert to the PB process and 
only saw it as one of several means to try to ‘pacify’ a restless Buenos Aires population in the 
aftermath of the Argentinazo. On the other hand, for all his attempts to use the PB process to 
try and build a Grupo Espacio Abierto political base, there is a distinct sense in Schifrin’s 
public pronouncements about PB that at one level, for a while at least, he was rather 
enthusiastic about it as a form of popular democratisation. 
 
This conflict remained more or less contained, with Ibarra essentially ignoring Schifrin and 
the PB as much as he could. The first public spat between the two really emerged during the 
2003 presidential elections campaign, when Schifrin decided to publicly back the eventual 
winner, Nestor Kirchner of the PJ, at a relatively early stage in the campaign, while Ibarra 
maintained a diplomatic silence in order to not damage any of the bridges he had built up with 
the parties of other well placed candidates, including most notably Elisa Carrió of the 
Alternativa por una República de Iguales movement (ARI – Alternative for a Republic of 
                                                 
96 El Clarín, 24 November 2002. 
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Equals). Kirchner’s election placed Schifrin centre-stage in political terms, particularly as 
Ibarra and the Frente Grande were up for re-election in September 2003 and faced a strong 
opposition from the populist right-wing businessman Mauricio Macri, nominally running on a 
PJ ticket. Schifrin – who was standing for election to the City Legislature, and therefore 
personally concerned with securing victory for the Frente Grande – negotiated an agreement 
with Alberto Fernández, Kirchner’s chief of staff, whereby Kirchner would weigh into the 
elections by campaigning for Ibarra, which he did, and Ibarra duly won re-election as a result, 
Kirchner riding a wave of unprecedented popularity at the time. 
 
Kirchner of course had his own agenda, which was to build a political support network that 
would allow him to challenge former president Eduardo Duhalde – who had hand-picked him 
as a putatively easily manipulated figurehead – for the control of the PJ. Kirchner sought very 
early on to build a counterpoint to Duhalde’s powerful grip on the Province of Buenos Aires 
(as opposed to the autonomous city), and his support for Ibarra against Macri – supported by 
Duhalde – was part of this strategy. It was widely thought that Kirchner’s price for supporting 
Ibarra would be to influence the composition of Ibarra’s new government, and indeed, when 
he operated a reshuffle after the elections, Ibarra appointed Héctor Cappacioli, who was 
known to be closely linked to Alberto Fernández, Kirchner’s chief of staff. The post 
Capaccioli took up was Secretary of Decentralisation and Citizen Participation, which had 
been vacated by Schifrin following his winning a seat in the City Legislature. This 
appointment led to something of a revolution in the Secretariat, as – with a single exception – 
all those that had been involved in implementing the PB process in 2002-2003 were pushed 
out by April 2004, and a new and highly inexperienced team had moved in. According to 
some accounts, after initially attempting and failing to control what was a relatively anarchic 
process (the original technical coordination team had worked very much through 
improvisation and informality, with the aim of making PB work, but hardly a recipe for 
institutionalising the process), Cappacioli decided that it required too much of an effort and 
decided to bring the PB process to an end by slowly cutting the central PB implementation 
budget and making sure that the process was implemented in 2004 in an opaque, haphazard, 
and piecemeal manner.97 Certainly, participation levels fell compared to 2003, with just 9,000 
people involved.98 
 
 
Conclusion 
As Vivien Lowndes remarks (paraphrasing Karl Polanyi), “politics is an ‘instituted process’, 
embedded in institutions political and non-political”.99 Certainly, it can be argued that the case 
of PB in Buenos Aires reflects this very well, but the case study presented arguably also 
reflects a further dimension about ‘instituted processes’, which is that they are frequently 
much less purposeful than we often imagine them to be. PB in Buenos Aires was arguably 
implemented and worked as an unintentional consequence of the interaction of different 
interests, networks, and incentives of specific political actors that come together in a broader 
context of crisis of the Argentinazo. This combination of factors produced the space within 
                                                 
97 Landau (2004: 10). 
98 One factor that also contributed to this was the development of tensions between Ibarra and Kirchner, with the 
City Legislature essentially polarising between these two poles. Upon taking his seat in the City Legislature, 
Schifrin rapidly converged to the pro-Kirchner, anti-Ibarra bloc. It is worth noting that he has said little about PB 
since leaving the Secretariat of Decentralisation and Citizen Participation, and indeed there is no mention of PB 
on his website (http://www.arielschifrin.com.ar). 
99 V. Lowndes, ‘Rescuing Aunt Sally: Take Institutional Theory Seriously in Urban Politics’, Urban Studies, 
38:11 (2001), p.1960. 
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which the PB process could develop in such a way as to assuage the evident democratic 
deficit in the city of Buenos Aires,100 and genuinely foster processes of positive social change. 
But it was a process that was ultimately enabled as a result of a particular constellation of 
competing and contradictory interests and practices that each sought to do different things and 
in doing so held each other in tension. Borrowing from Mary Douglas, it can therefore be 
argued that PB in Buenos Aires was a social outcome that emerged as a result of an ad hoc 
process of “bricolage”. 101  
 
Seen in this way, one could argue that PB in Buenos Aires stands in stark contrast to other 
instances of PB, such as those instituted in Porto Alegre or São Paulo. While politics very 
obviously matter in relation to the emergence of PB in Buenos Aires, they were clearly not 
important in the same way as the programmatic politics associated with the PT that is 
considered important by much of the literature on the factors contributing to the emergence of 
EDD initiatives. Politics matter in relation to the PB process in Buenos Aires, but they matter 
differently. This suggests that in order to understand such political processes, what we need to 
focus on are the specific context s in which these outcomes emerge and the ways in which the 
actions of different social actors interact with each other in order to construct these contexts. 
This is a crucial question, because, as Rebecca Abers highlights: 
people mobilize when there are windows of opportunities that lead them to 
believe that action will more likely bring results. Often, such enabling 
environments have to do with changes in the state power structure, such as the 
weakening of a powerful elite or the strengthening of reformist policy makers. 
Obviously, the creation of a responsive, participatory policy represents a 
particularly radical change in the ‘opportunity structure’ for collective action. 102 
What the experience of PB in Buenos Aires suggests, however, is that an enabling 
environment can also emerge unintentionally rather than through some form of conscious 
purpose.  
 
This insight also provides a glimmer of hope to what might on the surface seem like a rather 
depressing story about a process that resulted from a contingent ‘moment in time’, but which 
is slowly but inexorable dying a slow death. Although it is clear that PB in Buenos Aires will 
probably not survive further than next year at best, thinking in terms of the unintentional 
consequences of political processes does allow us to look beyond this time horizon. Certainly, 
at one level, as Andrea Cornwall highlights: 
participation, like citizenship, is something that is learnt through practice. While 
many invited spaces remain harsh testing grounds for beginners, they are part of a 
shifting institutional landscape in which longer term changes in the way people 
perceive and engage with governance may be taking root.103  
Even within two short years of coherent implementation, the practice of PB does seem to have 
left some traces among those that participated; this was something that came out strongly in 
interviews with ordinary participants, who although realising the precariousness of the 
process (the political story I have outlined above was not a secret) definitely felt that they had 
experienced something different.  
                                                 
100 On this issue, see P. Pírez, ‘Buenos Aires: Fragmentation and Privatization of the Metropolitan City’, 
Environment and Urbanization, 14:1 (2002), pp.145-158. 
101 M. Douglas, M., How Institutions Think , London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987, p.66.  
102 Abers (1998), p.530. 
103 Cornwall (2004), p.4. 
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Obviously, the total number of such militant ex-participants will inevitably be relatively small 
in comparison to the city population as a whole. Perhaps more encouragingly – in view of the 
general consensus within the literature that EDD initiatives tend to emerge under the impulse 
of small, committed group – the PB councillors of 2003, together with members of the 
Technical Coordination team and the NGOs involved in the process, have set up an 
organisation called Comunidad Activa (Active Community) to promote PB as a form of local 
governance, with a specific agenda to intensify it in Buenos Aires and spread it to other urban 
centres in Argentina. Perhaps most encouraging, however, is the fact that several of the 
members of the Technical Coordination who have moved on or been moved from the now 
moribund PB process have been autonomously experimenting with participatory forms of 
governance in the new institutional posts they occupy. This suggests that while the impact of 
the PB experiment on the city population may ultimately have been relatively small, it might 
well in the long run have contributed to initiating a change in the political culture of (local) 
governance in Buenos Aires. 
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